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Abstract 
This paper is addressed to intraregional income inequalities in 
the Netherlands. Various concepts are used to measure the degree of 
regional poverty. In addition, dissimilarity between intraregional 
income distributions is studied. At the provinclal level, relatively 
small and decreasing dissimilarities are observed. However, at lower 
spatial levels (especially within metropolitan areas) much larger 
dissimilarities .in mean income and income distribution occur. 
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1. Introduction 
In regional economie policies, equity issues are usually dealt 
with at the interregional level. The national average income per 
capita, or the national unemployment rite are often used as a refer-
ence point to decide whether special policy measures are necessary for 
a particular region. The aim of the present paper is to point out that 
intraregional inequalities should not be disregarded in this res-
pect. 
In most countries interregional income inequalities are rather 
small compared with intraregional inequalities. Focussing on one 
rather small component of total income inequality while neglecting 
the other components may have adverse effects on total inequality. A 
simple numerical example may be helpful to illustrate this. Consider 
two equally large regions with two equally large groups of income 
earners (see Table). In order to reduce the gap between the mean 
incomes of the two regions, special policies are carried out with 
respect to region 1 leading to an increase of mean income in region 1 
before 
policy 
af ter 
policy 
region 1 
group A income 
group B income 
mean income 
100 102 
240 246 
170 174 
region 2 
group A income 
group B income 
mean income 
120 
240 
180 
117 
235 
176 
mean income (both regions) 175 175 
interregional variance 25 1 
intraregional variance 4250 4332 
total variance 4275 4333 
and a decrease in region 2, leaving the national mean unchanged. Both 
groups in region 1 receive benefits from the policy, but the high 
income group's benefit is relatively larger. Comparing the 
interregional variances one observes a substantial reduction of 
inequalities. Total variance has increased, however, since the 
decrease of interregional variance has been more than off-set by the 
increase of intraregional variance. It may be concluded that for the 
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design of appropriate regional policies, intraregional equity issues 
are important. Such policies must be sufficiently focussed to ensure 
that intraregional inequalities are not affecte.d in a perverse way. 
Intraregional inequalities have received most attention at the 
urban level. Urban poverty is a topic in most textbooks on urban 
economics. This does not mean to say that poverty is always most 
severe or wide-spread in urban areas. In developing countries, poverty 
is usually much more intense in rural areas, but in urban areas it is 
often more concentrated and visible as reflected among others by slum 
areas with low quality housing and a low quality of public services. 
Intraregional income distribution is also important for locational 
patterns in the tertiary sector. Purchasing power is a key concept in 
the analysis of market areas for private sector activities. In a 
spatial context, purchasing power relates to the total income of all 
residents of a certain area. In addition to total income, also the 
income distribution must be taken into account, however. Consumption 
quotes may differ substantially among income groups, so that the 
branch composition of retail activities in a certain area will depend 
on the income distribution in the area. 
There is still another reason to pay attention to intraregional 
inequalities. In his well-known article on regional inequality, 
Williamson (1965), has fórmulated the hypothesis that as the national 
economy develops from a low level, interregional income inequality 
intensifies up to a certain stage of development, after which mean 
regional incomes start to converge. The debate about this hypothesis 
and the search for empirical findings for various countries has never 
fully stopped. For many countries indeed a convergence process has 
been obsërved after some stage of development. One may wonder, 
however, whether convergence of mean regional incomes also implies 
convergence of intraregional income d i s tr ibut i ons. • There is no 
logical reason why this should be the case. This point has been 
addressed by Fisch (1984) who has fórmulated a number of indicators 
for the dissimilarity between regional and national income 
distributions. 
In the present paper the development of intraregional income 
inequality and poverty will be investigated for the Netherlands from 
1960 to 1981. The analysis will be carried out at two spatial levels 
(the province and the so called Corop region, which is substantially 
smaller). In section 2 some concepts will be introduced to measure 
regional poverty as well as the dissimilarity between the intrare-
gional and national income distribution. Empirical results are pre-
sented in sections 3 and 4. 
2. Concepts 
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2.1. Poverty 
Poverty analy$is is a way of looking at the income distribution 
with special attention for its lower tail. 
When one wants to measure the degree of poverty in a certain 
population, two steps must be made: 
- the formulation of a Standard level of income, below which people 
are considered as poor (the poverty line) 
- the construction of an index to indicate to which extent the incomes 
of people fall below the poverty line. 
In this paper we will not discuss the first step. We will assume that 
analysis or government target setting has led to the fixation of the 
poverty line, Then, the question remains how to measure the degree of 
poverty in a certain population, given the poverty line. 
The index which is most frequently used is the head count 
ratio H, defined as the percentage of income earners below the 
poverty line (see e.g. Mills and Hamilton, 1984). However, as indi-
cated by Sen (1976), the head count ratio has some weak properties. If 
the income of a person below the poverty line is reduced, the head 
count ratio remains unchanged. This is an unattractive feature, since 
one feels that the intensity of poverty is increased by this change. 
Another poverty measure which is sometimes used is the income gap 
ratio I. The income gap g of a certain individual i is defined as 
the difference between the poverty line z and his income y^ : 
Ei = z - yj_ (1) 
The income gap ratio is defined as the mean income gap of people below 
the poverty line divided by the poverty Standard: 
I = (E gj)/ q.z (2) 
i 
where summation takes place over all persons below the poverty line; q 
is the total number of persons below the poverty line. Also this 
poverty measure is not without its problems, however. For example, it 
is insensitive to the number of people below the poverty line. 
Sen (1976) shows that on the basis of a number of axioms another 
poverty index can be derived which takes into account the information 
contained in H and I, as well as information on the distribution of 
incomes below the poverty line. This index is: 
P = H[I +(1-I)G] (3) 
4 
where G is the Gini index of the distribution of incomes below the 
poverty line. In the exceptional case that all incomes below the 
pover.ty line are equal, G will be equal to zero, so that P is the 
product of the head count ratio and the income gap ratio (P = H.I). 
Data requirements for empirical computation of P are relatively mod-
est, so that P can also be used for regional applications. Empirical 
applications of these concepts will be given in section 3. 
2.2 Dissimilarity of Regional Income Distributions 
As emphasized by Fisch (1984), convergence of mean regional in-
comes does not necessarily imply that the distribution of incomes 
within regions converges to the national Income distribution. To 
measure the dissimilarity between the income distribution of a certain 
region and of the nation, one can proceed as follows: 
Pij denotes the number of households in income class j in region i 
P^* denotes the number of households in region i 
ej denotes the nation's proportion of households in income class j. 
Then ei Pi* is the number of households in income class j and 
region i if the (groupwise) income distribution in region i is 
identical with the national income distribution. Fisch (1984) proposes 
to measure the dissimilarity between the regional and national income 
distribution as: 
m = 1. £ lp. .-e.P '1/ P.„ (4) 
ï* 2 . ' ij j ï*1 ï* 
J 
This measure indieates the proportion of the regional population that 
has to move in order for the region to achieve the nation's distribu-
tion. 
Another approach would be to measure the proportion of regional 
income which moves with the population between income classes in order 
for the region to achieve the nations distribution. For this approach 
one needs information on mean income per income class and per region: 
y„ .: mean income in incotneclass j 
_ J 
y.„ . . . i*: mean income in region ï 
y**: mean income in nation 
Then, after neutralizing for the difference between the regional and 
national income average, one obtains for the abovementioned measure: 
n.s = |[z y.jlP.j - ejP.J-P.Jy^-y^lJ/P.^y.* (5) 
The second term within square brackets is added to neutralize for the 
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difference between y.
 s and y^. An unattractive property of n.^ 
is that it may in certain cases become negative, whereas zero would be 
the natural minimum value for a dissimilarity measure'') . 
We will now show that the measur.es m^* and n-[* may give rise 
to counter-intuitive results. Consider for example Table 1. 
case a case b 
Income Region i: Region i: Nation 
class j 1 2 1 2 
1 10 30 20 20 40 
2 30 30 40 20 . 60 
3 30 30 20 40 60 
4 30 10 20 20 40 
total 100 100 100 100 200 
Table 1. Hypothetical regional distributions 
of households among 4 income classes. 
In case (a), the dissimilarity between the national distribution 
and the regional distributions occurs in the tails, whereas in case 
(b) it occurs in the middle income classes. This is not taken into 
account in the dissimilarity measure mj_*, which is equal to .10 for 
both regions in both cases. Yet, the transfer of households in case 
(a) is between income classes which are much further removed than in 
case (b). When the income distributions of Table 1 are formulated in a 
cumulative way, one arrivés at Table 2. This table clearly shows that 
case a case b 
Income Region i : Region i : Nation 
class j • 1 2 1 2 
1 10 30 20 20 20 
2 40 60 60 40 50 
3 70 90 80 80 80 
4 100 100 100 100 100 
Table 2. Cumulative distributions of income (in %) 
in case (b) the regional distributions are much closer to the national 
distribution than in case (a). Therefore one would say, intuitively, 
that the intraregional incorae distributions in case (a) are less 
similar to the national distribution than in case (b). 
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Do the measures n^* take into account this point? Assume that 
the average income in the 4 income classes amounts to 1,2, 4 and 8, 
respeetively. Then, in case (a) qne obtains: n-| * = .023 and n2* = 
.034, whereas in case (b) the corresponding values are: .059 and .053. 
respeetively. Thus, according to the measure nj_*, the regional 
distributions in case (b) are clearly less similar to the national 
distribution than they are in case (a), which is just the opposite of 
our statements above. We conclude that situations may occur where 
mi*, and especially n^* yield counter-intuitive results. 
The background of this problem is that the type of scale used for 
income is cardinal. As a cónsequence, one knows that an exchange 
between classes 1 and 4 implies a larger step than an exchange between 
classes 2 and 3. There would not be a basis to say this if the distri-
bution would be studied of a nominal variable. Note that the field 
where these dissimilarity indices are most intensively used, is resi-
dential segregation: here, the variable studied (ethnicity) is indeed 
nominal. A transfer of these indices to a field where a cardinal 
variable is studied leads to an incomplete use of the available infor-
mation which may easily yield counter-intuitive results as the above 
examplè shows. 
Is it possible to develop alternative measures for m^* or n^* 
which take into account the cardinal' character of income? A natural 
way to do this is to make use of information on the distances between 
the various income classes. For example, using the mean incomes per 
class already mentioned above, case Ca) would involve a transfer 
between income classes with a difference in mean income which is equal 
to 7, whereas in case (b) this difference is only 2. In general, let 
xjjt be the number of households transferred from income class j to 
j' to let the intraregional income distribution coincide with the 
national distribution. Thüs for region i: 
E x. ., =e.,P.„ 
, JJ' J' 1* 
J
 (7) 
E x. ., = P. . 
j, JJ' U 
The income difference covered by a transfer XJJI amounts to 
|y*T - y * 1 . 1 -
Then the total income transfer is equal to 
a. = E ly*. - y* -,Ix . ., (7) 
1 jj.,' *J *J'' JJ' 
Obviously, the values of Xjj> are not uniquely determined by ( 6 ) . 
Therefore one could use the minimum values of a^ as a measure for 
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the dissimilarity between the regional and national income distribu-
tion. This would lead to solving the following transportation problern: 
min! a. = z jy*. - y*., |x.., 
JJ' JJ 
subject to zx... =e.,P.„ ,
 Q* 
j JJ' J' i* (8) 
Z x. = P.. 
Jf JJ' U 
x > 0 for all j, j' 
There is no need to use an LP package to find the minimum value of 
aj_. As shown in Appendix I, this value (which will be denoted as 
bj_) is equal to: 
b i = i p i i " e i p i * l - | y* i _ y»2 l 
+
 l(Pii+Pi2)~(e1+e2)Pi*l'|y*2~y*3l 
+ ... (9) 
+
 l(Pi1+Pi2+---+Pi)J-1)-(e1+e2+---+ej-1)Pi*l' 
Note that in (9), the left hand side in each term indicates the dissi-
milarity in the cumulative income distribution of' the region i and the 
nation. 
The minimum value bj_ found for the date in Table 1 is 70 for 
both regions in case (a), and 2o for both regions in case (b). This is 
clearly in agreement with the intuitive notion already mentioned 
above. 
One can standardize the index b^ by dividing it through regional 
income, so that one arrivés at: 
c. = b . / ? .„y . „ 
ï i i* Jï* 
(10) 
Aggregate indicators of dissimilarity can easily be derived from 
the dissimilarity indicators pertaining to particular regions. Thus, 
the aggregate of the m^*'s can be formulated as: 
m#» = l (P^/P**) <V ° 1 ) 
i 
The formula for n** is given by Fisch (1984). Finally, the appropri-
ate expression for c# would be: 
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c* = z (P1#yi#)/(P»»y»#) c. (12) 
i 
Empirical applications of these concepts will be given in section 4. 
3- Empirieai Analy.sis of Regional Poverty 
In this section, empirical results will be presented on regional 
poverty in the Netherlands since 1960. Data on regional income distri-
bution have been published regularly by the Central Bureau of Statis-
tics (CBS). These data are based on income-tax records; they refer to 
persons living in the Netherlands who receive an income. Married 
couples have been regarded as one income earner. The data display 
several weaknesses, which must be taken into account. To mention some 
of them: 
- Income earners may display a tendenc'y towards underrating their 
incomes vis a vis fiscal authorities. There are strong indications 
that the informal sector - implying unreported incomes - has grown 
substantially during the past 15 years in the Netherlands. 
- In the course of the years the CBS has repeatedly applied slight 
changes in the definition of income. 
- Not all categories of income earners have been treated in the same 
way during the period since 1960. For example, holidayworkers have 
been excluded in the more recent years. 
- The procedures used in regard of persons who only earned an income 
during part of the year (e.g. because of emigration), have not re-
mained the same during the period since 1960 (for a fulier account, 
refer to Bartels, 1977, CBS, 1979 and 1983). 
Results' will be reported for the years 1960, 1969, 1978 and 1981. 
The income concept used is: "total income earned before taxes", except 
for "the year 1981, where disposable income is used. 
Some computational matters deserve our attentron before empirical 
results will be given. For the computation of the Gini index, one 
usually employs a piecewise linear Lorenz curve, which implies that 
all incomes in a certain income class are assumed to be equal to the 
mean income in that class. This is not entirely satisfactory, espe-
cially when the number of income classes is not so large, as is some-
times the case with regional data. Therefore, we have used two inter-
polation techniques described by Kakwani (1980), one in which the 
Lorenz curve is piecewisely approximated as a polynomial function of 
degree 3, and one where the Lorenz curve is based on a probability 
density function which is piecewisely linear. It appeared that the two 
approximations are usually quite near. 
The poverty line is computed as the minimum wage as established by 
law by the Dutch government in 1981. To make results comparable be-
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tween periods, the ratio of the poverty line and mean income is taken 
as a constant for all years. Some experiments have been carried out to 
investigate the sensitivity of the results for the choice of the 
poverty line. It appears that the relative positions of the regions 
are only slightly affected by a shift of the poverty line (see also 
Atkinson, 1987). 
The poverty lines obtained do not coincide with the boundary of 
one of the income classes. Therefore, poverty indices cannot be com-
puted directly. An interpolation of the income distribution in the 
income class in which the poverty line falls is necessary first, to 
approximate the share of income earners in that class which is below 
the poverty line. For this purpose we have used again the abovemen-
tioned interpolation techniques. 
In Table 3» the developments of inequality and poverty indicators 
at the national level are presented2). The table shows a declining 
trend of income inequality and poverty indicators in the Netherlands. 
1960 1969 1978 1981 
Gini index .449 .410 .335 .261 
Head count ratio - .326 .254 .175 
Income gap ratio - .407 .328 .216 
Sens poverty index - .183 .117 .053" 
Table 3. National development of income inequality and poverty. 
Of course, intertemporal comparisons are hampered by the data problems 
mentioned above3). Yet, in this case the main trends are so clear 
that- it seems safe to state that the observed decrease of inequality 
and poverty is genuine, and not just the result of data peculiarities. 
This is not a surprising result: The system of social welfare pay-
ments, implying a considerable degree of income redistribution, devel-
oped rapidly in the Netherlands since 1960. 
We will now turn to i nter r eg ion al comparisons. If we may assume 
that all regions are affected to the same degree by data problems, 
interregional comparisons remain valid. The interregional analysis 
will be carried out at two spatial levels, i.e. the province (of which 
there are 11), and'the so-called corop region (of which there are 40). 
We start with the provincial results of 1981 (see Table 4). The natio-
nal level of the variables is set equal to 100. The table shows that 
interprovincial differences in mean income and poverty are modest in 
the Netherlands for 1981. 
High average incomes are found in the Western, most highly urban-
ized provinces of the Netherlands (Utrecht, North Holland and South 
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Holland) . 
province mean Gini head income Sen 
income index count 
r a t i o 
gap 
r a t i o 
index 
Groningen 94.6 99.7 110.7 107.1 119.5 
F r i e s l and 94.6 94.9 106.0 100.0 106.4 
Drenthe 97.1 96.9 100.8 101 .7 102.9 
Over i j s se l 96.1 97.3 106.4 100.2 107.0 
Gelderland 98.3 98.8 103.2 100.7 104.6 
Utrecht 104.4 100.7 88.3 99.3 88.1 
N Holland 102.0 102.3 97.7 99.2 96.4 
Z Holland 102.3 101 .9 99.1 96.5 94.7 
Zeeland 99.8 96.6 95.3 95.0 91 .0 
N Brabant 100.0 99.8 99.4 105.0 104.6 
Limburg 97.3 96.8 102.1 100.6 1 03.2 
Table 4. Provincial income inequality and poverty, 1981 
(the Netherlands = 100). 
In the Northern part of the Netherlands (Groningen and Friesland) the 
lowest mean incomes are observed. Comparison with the results for the 
other years (see Appendix II) yields that the main pattern of inter-
provincial differences has remained unchanged during the period con-
sidered. In all years, the three Western provinces had above average 
incomes. The size of the differences between the regions has become 
smaller, however. Within the group of below-average provinces, some 
provinces changed positions. The provinces of Drenthe, Gelderland and 
North-Brabant improved their positions at the expense of the other 
provinces, especially Groningen. 
The income inequality as represented by the Gini index appears to 
be highest in the richer provinces. There is no intrinsic reason why 
this should be so: the Gini index is scale neutral, i.e. its value 
remains unchanged when incomes are multiplied with an arbitrary pos-
itive constant. Thus, in the richer Western provinces, income inequal-
ity is higher, both in absolute and relative terms. The correlation 
coëfficiënt between mean income and the Gini index is rather high 
(.72) in 1981 (see Table 5). 
Inequality indicators as such do not say much about poverty. A 
high degree of inequality may be due to extremes in both the upper and 
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lower tail of the distribution. Therefore, we also use the three 
poverty indices discussed in section 2. Indeed, rather moderate cor-
relation eoefficients are observed between the Gini index and the 
three poverty indices. 
1 2 3 4 5 
1. mean income 1.00 .72 -.89 -.48 -.85 
2. Gini index +.72 . 1.00 -.36 +.03 -.27 
3. head count 
ratio -.89 -.36 1.00 +.55 +.93 
4. income gap 
ratio -.48 +.03 +.55 1.00 +.81 
5. Sen index -.85 -.27 +.93 +.81 1.00 
Table 5. Correlation matrix, provincial poverty, 1981. 
The correlation coëfficiënt between the head count ratio and the Sen 
index is very high (.93). considerably higher than the correlation 
coëfficiënt between the income gap ratio and the Sen index. This 
result holds true for each year of observation. This suggests that, 
although the head count ratio is subject to some methodological reser-
vations, it is a reasonable alternative for the Sen index for many 
practical purposes. Correlation eoefficients between mean income on 
the one hand and the head count ratio and the Sen index on the other 
hand are strongly negative in most years. Thus, the tendency can be 
observed that in provinces with high mean incomes, relatively little 
poverty occurs. These results imply that selecting regional devel-
opment areas on the basis of below average mean regional income will 
yield approxi- mately the same outcome as selecting such areas on the 
basis of pover- ty indices such as the head count ration or the Sen 
index. In other words: with the given data, regions with a low mean 
income coincide with regions in which many poor people live. Thus, by 
focussing on mean income and ignoring intraregional income distribu-
tion at the phase of selecting regional development areas, not much 
harm is done. This does not mean to say that intraregional inequali-
ties can be ignored altogether. In the phase of policy design, the 
distributional effects of policies deserve attention. As already 
indicated in section 1, what is good for the mean regional performance 
is not necessarily good for the region's poor. 
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Is it possible to explain the differences between income distribu-
tions of the various regions? The level of income is related among 
others to personal supply factors such as gender, age, educational 
level, as well as to the structure of labour demand in a region (see 
Rietveld, 1987b). A low level of mean income in a region may be for 
example due to the presence of a relatively large group of pensioners. 
From the perspective of regional labour market policies, this is very 
different from a situation where low incomes are due to a lack of well 
paid jobs. 
The available data do not allow a detailed integrated analysis of 
mean Gini head income Sen 
income index count gap index 
province r a t i o r a t i o 
Groningen 94.8 100.3 111.4 107.8 119.9 
F r i e s l and 95.8 94.7 104.9 92.3 101 .8 
Drente 97.2 96.5 102.6 99.9 103.3 
Ove r i j s s e l 96.4 96.8 105.5 96.3 104.3 
Gelderland 98.6 98.4 100.6 102.1 101 .9 
Utrecht 104.2 100.8 90.9 93.2 87.5 
N Holland 102.0 102.6 99.0 99.1 98.2 
Z Holland 102.5 102.0 97.8 98.6 95.5 
Zeeland 100.7 96.3 90.7 97.5 89.1 
N Brabant 99.6 99.5 99.6 104.3 102.9 
Limburg 96.2 97.1 106.3 101 .7 106.8 
Table 6. Provincial income inequality and poverty, 1981, 
after correction for differences in age composition 
(the Netherlands = 100). 
the determinants of income. It is possible however, to carry out some 
partial analyses for individual factors. For example, by computing the 
regional income distribution which would arise if the income earners 
in the region would have the same age distribution as in the nation' 
(see Table 6). Comparing Tables 6 and 4, we may conclude that 
differences in the age distribution of provincial populations only 
play a minor role in explaining interprovincial differences in mean 
income and poverty incidence. Unfortunately, such an analysis cannot 
be carried out for differences in educational level or ethnicity 
because of lack of data. 
If one limits attention to the group of income earners being in 
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the labour market, thus leaving out groups of persons such as 
pensioners, poverty allowance recipients and disability allowance 
recipients, one arrivés at Table 7. One would expect that the national 
social welfare system would lead to a high degree of interprovincial 
homogeneity among these groups being outside the labour market. Thus, 
one would arrive at higher interprovincial descrepancies for the 
labour force than for the group of all income earners as a whole. 
mean Gini head income Sen 
income index count gap index 
province r a t i o r a t i o 
Groningen 96.4 100.4 106.6 102.8 110.0 
F r i e s l and 93.7 96.7 115.6 106.9 126.2 
Drente 96.1 98.9 113.4 106.4 119.4 
Over i j s se l 95.7 98.5 114.2 99.9 114.6 
Gelderland 97.4 99.5 110.0 98.7 109.6 
Utrecht 102.8 ' 102.0 93.7 96.0 90.3 
N Holland 102.8 101 .5 91 .1 96.6 88.4 
Z Holland 103.1 100.4 93.0 99.5 92.0 
Zeeland 101 .1 95.9 89.4 106.8 93.7 
N Brabant 99.0 100.2 "106.0 102.3 .107.8 
Limburg 97.6 97.0 101 .9 96.5 98.7 
Table 7. Provincial income inequality and poverty, 1981, 
labour force only (the Netherlands = 100). 
Indeed, such a tendency can be observed, although the differences 
between Tables 4 and 7 remain rather limited for mean income. For the 
poverty indices somewhat larger shifts can be observed. We may con-
clude that the Dutch social welfare system has a dampening effect on 
interregional differences in poverty incidence. 
The relatively small interregional di^erences observed in the 
above tables obviously have to do with the low degree of spatial 
disaggregation implied by the use of provincial data. For 1978, data 
on the interregional income distribution are available at the level of 
so called Corop regions, being considerably smaller than provinces. In 
the Netherlands there are 40 Corop regions with an average population 
size of 350,000 persons. The results are shown in Table 8. Comparing 
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Corop mean Gin i head income Sen 
r e g i o n income i n d e x count gap i n d e x 
p r o v i n c e r a t i o r a t i o 
Gron ingen 1 89.3 8 8 . 8 1 0 5 . 3 96 .1 101 . 7 
2 96 .1 9 1 . 7 9 5 . 4 9 7 . 2 9 2 . 6 
3 9 3 . 7 9 8 . 7 1 1 0 . 4 1 0 0 . 2 110 .9 
F r i e s l a n d 4 9 3 . 8 95 .1 1 0 4 . 3 9 4 . 4 99 .1 
5 9 3 . 7 9 5 . 8 105.1 9 6 . 9 1 0 2 . 2 
6 9 4 . 0 9 4 . 8 1 0 2 . 4 9 5 . 8 9 8 . 5 
D r e n t e 7 102 .0 100 .9 9 8 . 4 94.1 9 2 . 9 
8 9 2 . 2 9 0 . 2 1 0 0 . 7 100 .4 1 0 2 . 3 
9 9 5 . 3 9 3 . 4 100 .2 9 4 . 9 9 6 . 3 
O v e r i j s s e l 10 9 6 . 5 9 7 . 9 101 . 8 1 0 2 . 6 1 0 4 . 4 
11 9 6 . 5 9 6 . 3 102 .5 9 6 . 3 9 9 . 2 
12 9 4 . 8 94 .1 9 8 . 8 9 8 . 9 98 .1 
G e l d e r l a n d 13 9 7 . 0 96 .6 1 01 . 7 9 9 . 7 101 .2 
14 9 6 . 7 9 7 . 0 9 8 . 3 9 8 . 7 9 7 . 4 
15 97 .6 9 9 . 6 101 . 3 1 0 5 . 8 106 .9 
16 94 .'O 9 6 . 3 1 0 7 . 6 1 0 0 . 8 1 0 8 . 8 
U t r e c h t 17 106 .9 1 0 4 . 3 9 3 . 9 102 .6 9 5 . 9 
N H o l l a n d 18 9 8 . 5 9 6 . 7 9 7 . 6 111.1 1 0 8 . 3 
19 1 0 7 . 3 99 .6 87 .1 100 .9 8 8 . 3 
20 107 .5 9 5 . 9 8 3 . 8 9 9 . 7 8 3 . 8 
21 108 .5 1 0 6 . 3 9 3 . 8 9 3 . 0 8 7 . 7 
22 101 .6 9 4 . 2 9 0 . 2 105 .2 93 .6 
23 97 .2 1 04 .1 112 .4 103 .5 113-5 
24 1 1 7 . 8 114 .4 8 7 . 4 98 .1 8 5 . 5 
Z H o l l a n d 25 105 .4 1 0 7 . 7 1 0 2 . 3 1 0 4 . 2 104 .8 
26 107 .4 107 .5 9 8 . 0 97 .6 9 4 . 9 
27 1 0 6 . 7 1 0 4 . 5 9 5 . 9 102 .4 98 .1 
28 108.1 1 0 2 . 3 9 2 . 3 9 9 . 8 92 .6 
29 9 9 . 7 99 .4 102 .9 9 9 . 0 101 . 5 
30 103 .7 9 5 . 7 8 9 . 6 9 7 . 7 8 8 . 2 
Z e e l a n d 31 9 7 . 9 9 5 . 8 9 7 . 9 9 3 . 6 91 .7 
- 32 98 .4 9 5 . 8 9 8 . 0 9 3 . 8 93 .1 
N B r a b a n t 33 1 0 0 . 5 9 6 . 7 94 .1 103 .0 97 .2 
34 97 .4 96 .4 9 8 . 7 1 0 0 . 7 9 9 . 2 
35 9 9 . 5 9 8 . 5 9 6 . 9 1 0 6 . 3 1 0 2 . 8 
36 101 .4 1 0 0 . 8 9 7 . 4 104 .4 101 . 8 
Limburg 37 9 6 . 8 9 7 . 8 102 .4 100 .2 103.1 
38 96 .4 96 .6 1 0 0 . 7 101 .9 103 .4 
39 9 4 . 4 9 4 . 5 1 0 2 . 7 9 8 . 8 102 .6 
G e l d e r l a n d 40 106 .0 8 6 . 9 71 .0 120 .2 8 4 . 8 
Table 8. Income inequality and poverty at the Corop level, 1978 
(The Netherlands = 100) 
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Table 8 with Table A.II.3 from the appendix, we observe that inter-
regional differences are much larger at the Corop level than at the 
provincial level. 
The region with the lowest mean income is Corop 1, being part of 
the province of Groningen in the Northern part of the country; this 
area is characterized by a stagnating regional economy and an 
infavourable economie structure. An interesting region is Flevoland 
(Corop 40), which combines a high level of mean income with a low Gini 
index. This region consists of newly reclaimed land (used for 
agricultural and residential purposes) to which mainly younger people 
move, which gives rise to a relatively rich and homogeneous 
population. The highest mean income is found in Corop 24, which is 
generally considered as an attractive residential area, with a 
location not far from the city of Amsterdam. 
The main cities in the Netherlands (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The 
Hague and Utrecht) are parts of the Corop regions 23, 29, 26 and 17, 
respeetively. For the Corop regions containing the two largest of 
these cities (23 and 29), mean incomes are found which are among the 
lowest in the Western provinces. Table 8 also shows that the poverty 
incidence in these regions is above the national average. Thus, above 
average poverty incidence is not only a feature of rural areas in the 
periphery, but also of metropolitan areas in the highly urbanized 
Western part of the country. 
mean Gin i head income Sen 
income index coun t gap i n d e x 
r e g i o n r a t i o r a t i o 
u r b a n c o r e : 
Amsterdam 90 .6 101 .9 1 2 2 . 8 1 0 3 . 7 123 .4 
Ro t t e rdam 91 .6 99 .4 119 .0 9 8 . 9 116 .6 
The Hague 99.1 103 .9 108 .6 9 6 . 0 103.1 
U t r e c h t 9 2 . 5 9 7 . 8 1 1 1 . 5 1 0 6 . 8 117 .6 
s u b u r b a n r i n g : 
Amsterdam 116.6 103 .6 81 .6 1 0 3 . 3 8 4 . 5 
Rot te rdam 109.0 9 6 . 9 8 4 . 3 9 9 . 3 8 4 . 0 
The Hague 129 .0 1 0 9 . 8 7 0 . 7 104 .0 73-5 
U t r e c h t 113.0 1 0 5 . 8 8 6 . 6 101 . 0 87 .4 
Table 9. Urban income inequality and poverty, 1978 
(the Netherlands = 100). 
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An even more impressive picture of urban poverty is obtained when 
the Corop regions containing the four main cities are divided into two 
parts: the central city and the rest (the "suburban ring"). As Table 9 
shows, the large cities have on average low mean incomes, comparable 
with the most unfavourable rural areas. The degree of poverty observed 
is even considerably more serious than in rural areas. In the Nether-
lands, urban poverty has become a more serious phenomenon than rural 
poverty. In addition, since the population size of the main cities is 
much larger than that of the low income rural Corop regions, urban 
poverty can also be said to be more widespread than rural poverty. 
The suburban rings are invariably characterized by high mean 
incomes and low degrees of poverty incidence. The aggregate indicators 
for metropolitan areas as represented in Table 8 hide a considerable 
degree of dissimilarity between urban cores and suburban rings. In the 
economie landscape of metropolitan areas, spatial proximity and simil-
arity of income distribution do not go hand in hand. 
4. Dissimilarities in Intraregional Income Distributions 
For the analysis of dissimilarities in intraregional income dis-
tributions use will be made of the concepts presented in section 2.2. 
In Table 10 the aggregate results are given for the period from 1960 
to 1981 . 
1960 1969 1978 1981 
dissimilarity 
index 
m** .047 .036 .029 .025 
n** .065 .049 .037 .030 
c* .078 .057 .035 .025 
interregional 
inequality 
indicator 
Gini index 
coëfficiënt of 
variation 
Table 10. Dissimilarity indicators for intra-
provincial income distributions. 
As indicated by the Gini index and the coëfficiënt of variation, a 
clear convergenee of mean provincial incomes has taken place during 
this period. A decrease of interregional differences between mean 
.040 .034 .012 .011 
.081 .063 .039 .028 
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incomes does not necessarily imply that the income distributions of 
regions have become more similar, however. To check this, the measures-
m**, n** and c* have been computed. The figures in Table 10 
clearly show that with the convergence of mean incomes also the income 
distributions have converged: the regional income distributions have 
become more similar to the national income distribution. Comparing 
these outcomes with Fisch's results for the USA, we find that the 
degree of interregional dissimilarity is much higher in the USA than 
in the Netherlands. 
Does this result also hold true for each individual region? Nurner-
ical results on the indicators m^*, nj_* and Cj_, as well as on 
y.*/y** (the ratio of regional and national income) are given for 
each province in Appendix III. It is found that in all provinces 
except Groningen and Utrecht a clear convergence process has taken 
place. The indicators usually display rather parallel developments. 
The index n^* is the one which most frequently is not in agreement 
with the tendencies indicated by the other indices. 
For a more accurate account of the similarity between the indi-
cators, cross-sectional correlation coefficients have been computed 
(see Table 11). The correlations are rather high. Especially 
jy • .-y**!^** and c. are highly correlated. 
m.„ 1.00 .92 .87 .74 
ï* 
n.„ .92 1.00 .64 .45 
ï* 
c. .87 .64 1.00 .96 
1^.-7**1/7»* -74 .45 .96 1.00 
Table 11. Correlation coefficients between dissimilarity 
indicators (1981). 
The index nj_* is the one which is least similar to the other 
indicators. 
Comparing correlation coefficients for the various years, one 
observes a tendency that they become higher as convergence has pro-
ceeded further. Thus, the higher the degree of similarity in a multi-
regional system, the stronger the indicators are correlated. This 
suggests that in highly converged systems the choice of a certain 
dissimilarity index is not such a critical issue. With a low average 
degree of similarity, the choice of a certain index may considerably 
18 
influence the outcomes, however. 
Williamson (1965) mentions four factors which play a main role as 
determinants of increased ov decreased interregional disparities: 
migration of labour, migration of capital, Interregional linkages and 
central government policy. All of them appear relevant for an explana-
tion of the developments in the Netherlands since 1960. 
In the 1960's the laèour market was very tight in the Western 
provinces, so that many firms decided to relocate or to open new 
plants in other parts of the country. This process of capital migra-
tion nas stimulated a more even interregional distribution of incomes. 
In addition, large changes took place in the fields of interre-
gional linkages and labour migration. The improvement and extension of 
the Dutch road network enabled many people to move to more attractive 
regions of residence, while at the same time continuing their work in 
the region of origin. As a result, many people moved to the provinces 
near to North and South Holland: Utrecht, Gelderland and North 
Brabant. These migrants earned relatively high incomes so that a 
shrinking gap can be observed between the region of origin and of 
destination. 
Another aspect of labour migration pertains to foreign labour. 
Foreign migrants who earn relatively low incomes usually located in 
the cities of the Western provinces, thus contributing to a decrease 
of mean incomes in these areas. 
Also the government has played a role in the convergence process. 
The public sector has grown at very high rates between 1960 and 1980. 
The interpersonal equity implied by the social welfare arrangements 
has also led to a higher degree of interregional equity (see Molle and 
Beumer, 1984 for a more detailed analysis of determinants of the 
decrease of interregional income disparity). 
We will only shortly discuss the results obtained when 
dissimilarity indices are computed for Corop regions^). The results 
are completely in line with those of the preceding section: in Corop 
regions with a mean income which is far removed from the national 
average, one observes high values of the dissimilarity indices. When 
in the metropolitan Corop regions a division is made between urban 
core and suburban ring, high dissimilarity scores are found for both 
of them: the former because its incomes are clearly below the national 
average and the latter for the opposite reason. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
It must be emphasized that due to data weaknesses already mentioned 
above the empirical results are less exact than they may seem to be. 
Some other limitations of our approach deserve attention. 
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Footnotes 
1. Formula (5) differs slightly from the one given by Fisch in that a 
factor (1/2) has been added. The index n^* may become negative 
when the mean income per income class is npt equal for all regions. 
2. For 1960 no reliable values of poverty indices could be computed 
due to the limited number of income classes distinguished below the 
poverty line. 
3. Comparability is also obviated by the varying number of income 
classes used per year (respectively 17, 12, 19 and 19) and by the 
fact that 1981 data relate to disposable rather than total income. 
M. This method is similar to computing the regional component in 
.shift-share analysls; in this case population is distinguished 
according to age groups. 
5. For one Corop region a negative value of the n^* is found. As 
already indicated in section 2.2, this is an unattractive property 
for a dissimilarity index. 
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Appendix I Solution of linear programming problem 
The linear programming problem (8) nas multiple optima. In the 
present context this property does not cause difficulties since we are 
only interested in the value of the objective function, not in the 
value of the xjjt's. It is not difficult to see that if a certain 
solution is optimal, there is another optimal solution where Xjjt * 
0 for all j, j' satisfying |j-j'| 5 2. This means for example, that 
the ' value of the objective function does not change when a transfer 
from class 3 to 1 is redefined as a combination of a transfer from 
class 3 to 2 and a transfer from class 2 to 1. 
Another property of an optimal solution of (8) is that if Xj j i ^ 
0 then Xjtj = 0. Thus, there is an optimal solution which only 
entails transfers- between adjacent income classes and where cross-
hauling does not occur. 
The transfer between class 1 and 2 in this optimal solution is: 
x-12 = max (Pj_i-e-|Pi*, 0) 
x2-| = Max .(-Pii+e-iPi*, 0) 
Then, next the transfer between income classes 2 and 3 can be deter-
mined: 
x23 = max (Pjj-e-i Pi*+Pi2~e2pi*> °) 
X32 = max (-Pi-|+e1Pi*-Pi2+e2pi*> 0) 
Subseqüent application of this approach will lead to (9) after some 
rearranging of terms. 
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Appendix II Provincial incorae inequality and poverty (1960, 1969, 
1978) 
provincie mean Gini 
income index 
Groningen 93.6 93.9 
F r i e s l and 89.2 98.7 
Drenthe 86.3 95.5 
Over i j s se l 91.9 98.3 
Gelderland 91.9 96.4 
Utrecht 103.5 104.2 
N Holland 108.8 103.5 
Z Holland 108.3 97.2 
Zeeland 95.7 99.7 
N Brabant 92.3 101 .7 
Limburg 93.6 96.2 
Table A.II.1. Provincial income inequality, 1960 
(the Netherlands = 100). 
province mean Gini head income Sen 
income index count gap index 
ratio ratio 
Groningen 93.0 96.3 104.5 97.1 102.4 
F r i e s l and 89.9 95.9 110.8 97.7 108.8 
Drenthe 90.8 93.9 106.2 98.1 104.1 
Over i j s se l 91 .5 96.0 106.9 99.3 106.0 
Gelderland 94.8 98.3 105.1 100.3 105.2 
Utrecht 107.2 101 .4 92.6 97.6 90.6 
N Holland 104.5 101 .6 96.5 99.5 96.5 
Z Holland 106.9 101 .7 93.8 100.8 94.6 
Zeeland 98.6 97.0 99.5 ' 9 5 . 2 95.0 
N Brabant 96.6 99.8 104.3 102.3 105.4 
Limburg 93.0 95.6 103.6 101 .8 104.8 
Table A.II.2. Provincial income inequality and poverty, 
1969 (the Netherlands = 100). 
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province mean Gini head ineome Sen 
ineome index count gap index 
ratio ratio 
Groningen 9 2 . 9 9 5 . 3 107 .2 98 .1 105 .6 
F r i e s l a n d 9 3 . 9 9 5 . 0 103 .6 9 4 . 8 9 8 . 7 
Dren the 9 6 . 6 9 5 . 2 9 9 . 6 9 6 . 2 9 6 . 8 
O v e r i j s s e l 9 5 . 7 9 5 . 5 100.1 9 8 . 5 99 .0 
G e l d e r l a n d 9 7 . 9 9 8 . 8 101 . 3 101 .1 102 .5 
U t r e c h t 106 .9 1 0 4 . 3 9 3 . 9 102 .6 9 5 . 9 
N H o l l a n d 1 0 2 . 3 103 .4 101 .1 101 .6 101 .7 
Z Ho l l and 103-8 102 .4 9 8 . 8 9 8 . 5 9 6 . 9 
Z e e l a n d 9 8 . 3 9 5 . 8 9 8 . 0 93-2 92 .1 
N B r a b a n t 9 9 . 9 9 8 . 3 9 6 . 7 103 .4 1 0 0 . 2 
Limburg 9 5 . 3 95 .6 101 . 8 9 9 . 6 1 0 2 . 3 
Table A.II.3- Provincial ineome inequality and poverty, 
1978 (the Netherlands = 100). 
* 
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Appendix I I I Dissimilari ty indices , provincial level (1960, 1969, 
1978 and 1981)*) 
Groningen 1960 1969 1978 1981 
m. „ 62 52 54 56 
n. „ 
ï* 
42 35 36 39 
c. 
i 
64 71 74 63 
y^ -* / y#* 93.6 93.0 92.9 94.6 
Friesland 
m. „ 
ï* 73 66 59 45 
n. „ 38 35 42 33 
c. 
i 
108 100 65 57 
y^/y** 89.2 89.9 93-9 94.6 
Drenthe 
m. „ 
ï* 
76 51 34 34 
n. „ 
ï* 
50 28 27 26 
c. 
i 
140 92 38 28 
^i* ^** 86.3 90.8 96.6 97.1 
Overijssel 
m. „ 
ï* 
54 52 35 35 
n. „ 35 29 -27 24 
c. 
i 
87 83 46 38 
y^/y** 91.9 91.5 95.7 96.1 
Gelderland 
m. „ 
ï* 
50 32 18 17 
v 28 16 12 12 
c. 
i 
87 50 22 16 
y^/y** 91.9 94.8 97.5 98.3 
Utrecht 
m . ï 
n. 
c. 
ï 
13 33 42 37 
6 12 25 21 
30 66 64 41 
y - * / y * * 103.5 107.2 106.9 104.4 
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N Holland 1960 1969 1978 1981 
m.„ 43 28 21 19 
n. „ 22 14 15 14 
c. 84 42 26 19 
y . * / y * * 108.8 104.5 102.3 102.0 
Z Holland 
m.„ 53 42 30 25 
n.„ 23 22 21 18 
ï * 
c. 75 65 38 24 
y .* /y** 108.3 106.9 103.6 102.3 
Zeeland 
m.* 44 22 22 35 
ï * 
36 13 19 35 
41 15 28 14 
95.7 98.6 98.3 99.8 
40 23 19 18 
16 11 19 16 
87 37 12 8 
y ^ / y * * 92.3 96.6 99.9 100.0 
Limburg 
m i # 39 31 35 20 
n.„ 38 13 24 15 -
ï * 
c. 70 66 50 27 
ï 
^ « / y * * 93.6 93.0 95.3 97.3 
Table A . I I I . 1 . D i s s i m i l a r i t y ind ices a t the p r o v i n c i a l l e v e l . 
;
 The values of m±*, n^* and c^ have been m u l t i p l i e d with a 
fac to r 1000. The values of y . ^ / y ^ have been m u l t i p l i e d with 
a fac to r 100. 1 
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